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Pauline Kleingeld
Kant on ‘Good’, the Good, and
the Duty to Promote the Highest Good
Kant’s account of the highest good is often regarded as a failure. He argues that
the highest good comprises both virtue and happiness, and he also claims that
we have a duty to promote it.S These claims raise difficult questions. First, given
that the account of the highest good in the Critique of Practical Reason is
phrased, in part, in terms of individual happiness in proportion to virtue (that
is, in terms of desert), it would seem that any duty to promote the highest
good would require us to act as moral judges in a way that Kant himself ada-
mantly rules out as impossible. Furthermore, the inclusion of happiness seems
to introduce “non-moral goods” into the highest good (Beck 1960: 242–3), and
this makes it hard to see how Kant could consistently call it a moral duty to pro-
mote it. Finally, Kant claims that this alleged duty goes “beyond” obedience to
the moral law and that it cannot be analytically derived from the moral law
(RGV 6:7n.; Gemeinspruch 8:280n.). This makes it even harder to see how this
duty can be justified, and what exactly this duty amounts to.
In this essay, I argue that there is a valid argument, on the basis of premises
Kant clearly endorses, for the conclusion that it is a duty to promote the highest
good, and I explain what this duty consists in. Because the main difficulties for
such an argument are often considered to stem from the inclusion of happiness
in the highest good, it is necessary to examine why he regards the highest good
as consisting of both virtue and happiness. This, in turn, requires a clear account
of what Kant means by ‘good’ in the first place, and the conditions under which,
on his understanding of ‘good’, happiness is indeed good. Therefore, I start by ex-
amining Kant’s distinction between ‘good’ and ‘pleasant’, and his account of what
is good (section 1). This provides the key to understanding why happiness, as one
of the two constituent parts of the highest good, is good – indeed morally good –
and not merely pleasant. The answer lies in the fact that it is a duty to promote the
happiness of others (section 2). Building on Kant’s account of the good and the
highest good, I then reconstruct a valid argument to the effect that it is a duty
to promote the highest good. I illustrate the structure of the argument with an ex-
ample that illuminates why this is a genuine duty even though it is ‘not contained
in the moral laws’ and how it goes beyond obedience to the Categorical Imperative
even though it does not add a separate duty (section 3). Kant’s improbable-sound-
￿ KpV ￿:￿￿￿, ￿￿￿, ￿￿￿, ￿￿￿; KU ￿:￿￿￿, ￿￿￿, ￿￿￿n.; RGV ￿:￿, ￿n.
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ing combination of claims starts to make sense only once we approach his account
of the highest good via his account of the good (section 3).
For the purpose of this paper, I draw on a distinction between two different
conceptions of the highest good that are found in Kant’s moral theory (Reath
1988; Kleingeld 1995). In many of his discussions of the highest good, Kant de-
fines it as a moral world, by which he means a world populated by fully virtuous
agents whose virtuous action causes happiness (KrV A808/B836; RGV 6:5; Ge-
meinspruch 8:280n.). At other times, most notably in the Dialectic of the second
Critique, he discusses the highest good “in a person” (KpV 5:110, emphasis
added), defining it as happiness in proportion to virtue. The first conception
of the highest good can more easily be developed on the basis of the principles
of Kant’s moral theory than the second. In this essay, I limit my discussion to the
conception of the highest good as a moral world. Kant’s conception of the high-
est good “in a person” requires separate treatment.Q Progress in our understand-
ing of Kant’s conception of the highest good as a moral world may also shed light
on the idea of the highest good ‘in a person’, but this issue lies beyond the scope
of this essay. Furthermore, I do not address the issue of the possibility of the
highest good, or associated issues regarding the nature, role, and justification
of the postulates of God and immortality.R Instead, I focus on the preliminary is-
sues of the concept of the highest good and, especially, the duty to promote it. 
1 Is Happiness Good? And What is Good Anyway?
In order to understand why happiness is part of the highest good, we need to un-
derstand why, and in what sense and under which conditions, happiness, as part
of the highest good, is deemed good, and not merely agreeable. The distinction
between ‘good’ and ‘agreeable’ is of fundamental importance to Kant’s moral
theory, for reasons that I shall clarify, in this section, on the basis of Kant’s dis-
cussion with Hermann Andreas Pistorius (1730–1798).
Kant starts the Groundwork with the famous claim that the only thing that
can be held to be good without limitation is a good will (GMS 4:393). He also
claims that his conception of a good will can already be found in every “natural
￿ See Engstrom ￿￿￿￿ for a detailed discussion. In Kleingeld ￿￿￿￿, I suggest an account of why
Kant, in the Critique of Practical Reason, discusses the highest good “in a person” in terms of the
proportionality between virtue and happiness (Kleingeld ￿￿￿￿: ￿￿￿).
￿ See Willaschek ￿￿￿￿ for a discussion of the postulates.
￿ The argument in this essay elaborates and partially modifies the account I sketched in outline
in Kleingeld ￿￿￿￿: ￿￿–￿.
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sound understanding” and that it needs not so much to be taught as only to be
clarified (GMS 4:397). As the title of the first section indicates, Kant starts his ar-
gument in the Groundwork from “common moral rational cognition”.
In his review of the Groundwork Pistorius criticizes Kant for proceeding in
this way. He complains that Kant should have first explained what he means
by ‘good’, and that an appeal to general public agreement can never be philo-
sophically decisive. Pistorius asks: “What is good anyway?” (Was ist überhaupt
gut?). This question is ambiguous and could mean “what does ‘good’ mean?”
or “which objects are good?” It seems that Pistorius has both in mind. He writes:
“In this regard I wish the author had liked to discuss first of all the general concept of what
is good, and to determine more precisely what he understands by it; because obviously, we
would first have to agree on this before we can make out anything concerning the absolute
value of a good will. Therefore, I am entitled to ask first: What is good anyway, and what is
a good will in particular? Is it possible to conceive of a will that is good in itself and regard-
ed without relation to any object? If one says: good is that which is generally approved and
valued, then I am permitted to ask further why it is approved and valued, does that happen
rightly [mit Recht] and with reason [mit Grunde] or not? General unanimous approval, if
this would occur or be possible on anything, would never be able to count as the ultimate
decisive reason for a philosophical researcher” (Pistorius, Rezension der Grundlegung zur
Metaphysik der Sitten, 449).⌦
Pistorius criticizes Kant for following a bad method. He claims that we cannot
determine whether a will is good unless we have first determined what is
good, and that we cannot determine what is good unless we have first settled
on a definition of ‘good’.
Pistorius has the impression that Kant’s appeal to widespread intuitions
about the unconditional goodness of a good will, in the first section of the
Groundwork, implies that he develops his moral theory on this basis. This, Pistor-
ius claims in the quoted passage, is bad philosophy: morality cannot be ground-
ed in mere intuitions that just happen to be widespread. A philosophical ground-
ing of morality should be able to provide an account of what is good and why. It
should be able to provide the reason why something that is widely claimed to be
good is indeed rightly regarded as good. Anything less is beneath the professio-
nal standards of philosophy.
Furthermore, Pistorius believes that it is impossible, without the help of “mate-
rial” presuppositions, to provide such an account of what is morally good. He as-
serts that we cannot decide whether a will is indeed good except by reference to
the goodness of the object or purpose of this will. If lawfulness as such were suffi-
￿ The translations of the quoted passages from Pistorius’ review are my own.
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cient to make a will good, Pistorius adds, then a will could be called good even if it
obeyed a bad law, and this would be absurd. Therefore, he writes,
“it must be a good principle, a good law, obedience to which makes a will good. […] we
must finally arrive at some object or at the final end of the law, and we must also make
use of the material [aspect], because we cannot make do with the formal [aspect] of either
the will or the law” (Pistorius, Rezension der Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, 449).
Kant feels the sting of Pistorius’ criticisms and replies extensively in the second
chapter of the Critique of Practical Reason, addressing the question “what is
good?” in both senses.↵ In response to the call for conceptual clarification, he
refers to the German semantic distinction between “the good” (das Gute) and
“well-being” (das Wohl) (KpV 5:59–60). Other languages, such as Latin, do not
have separate words for these, which leads to confusion, Kant argues, because
saying that an action is good (or evil) is fundamentally different from saying
that it serves our well-being (or our ill-being). In the latter case, we say some-
thing about the expected effects of an action on our feeling of pleasure or dis-
pleasure. To say that some course of action is good, by contrast, is to say that
there is sufficient reason to act in this way. This is true regardless of whether
the action is judged good in light of some antecedent end or good in itself
(KpV 5:58). In both cases, the question whether an action is good differs from
the question whether I regard it as conducive to pleasure. Thus, I may decide
to take a course of action towards which I feel aversion, because on the basis
of practical reasoning I recognize that doing so is good. Kant gives the example
of someone who needs to undergo surgery: he regards this as an ill (Übel) and as
highly unpleasant; yet on the basis of his reasoning he nevertheless declares it to
be good to undergo it (KpV 5:61).
Given the conceptual distinction between the good and the pleasant, and
given the fact that the judgment that an action is good – whether good in light
of an antecedent end or good in itself (morally, unconditionally, absolutely) – re-
quires reference to reasons for action, it follows that it is impossible to ground a
moral theory in a conception of the good that somehow precedes rational stand-
ards. Unless we can give a reason in support, the assertion that a certain object is
morally good would be merely arbitrary – philosophical footstamping without ra-
tional warrant. If the assertion is grounded in feeling, moreover, the alleged good
would actually be pleasant, and it would not deserve to be called good – let alone
absolutely and unconditionally good. In order for something to deserve being
called morally good, therefore, we need to be able to indicate why it is good,
￿ See Kant’s comment in the Preface, KpV ￿:￿.
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and such an account necessarily has to rely on rational standards. Therefore, mor-
ality cannot be grounded in a ‘material’ conception of the good, independently
from underlying rational criteria. Instead, as Kant claims to have shown in the
first chapter of the Critique of Practical Reason, the principle of morality is a formal
a priori principle of pure practical reason itself.
Once the principle of morality has been established, however, Kant argues,
this principle can be used to develop an account of what is morally good. This is
what he calls the “paradox of method” in a critique of practical reason (KpV
5:62–3). This paradox consists in the fact that it is impossible for a conception
of the good to ground moral principles, and that the conception of the good
must instead follow the determination of moral principles. He adds that this
methodological insight explains why he starts his Critique of Practical Reason
by considering moral principles, in the first chapter – showing both that no ma-
terial principle qualifies as a suitable basis for a moral law and that an a priori
principle of pure practical reason does qualify as the moral law – and why he
discusses the notion of the good only afterwards, in the subsequent chapter.
What, then, is the good, on his conception? The good is what we have reason
to do, whether conditionally (dependent on antecedent ends) or unconditionally
(morally, absolutely). Strictly speaking, the object of practical reason is always
an action or a way of acting, and never a thing (KpV 5:57, 60). Actions, in
turn, may be directed to the realization of something, of course. In such cases,
the object of practical reason is the action, and the object of the action is the re-
alization of the thing. If the action is good, then the object of the action may also
be called good by virtue of the goodness of the action. In that case, the goodness
of the object of the action derives from the goodness of the action.
The object of pure practical reason is that which is good “absolutely” and “in
every respect and without any further condition”. Again, strictly speaking this is
a “way of acting” (Handlungsart), not a thing (Sache) (KpV 5:60), because it is
that way of acting which it is morally possible to will (KpV 5:58). Whether it is
physically possible to act in such a manner or achieve the end at which the action
is directed, is a different matter (KpV 5:57–8). In other words, Kant equates the
question whether an action is morally good with the question whether it is an ob-
ject of pure practical reason and with the question “whether we are allowed to
will [wollen dürfen] an action which is directed to the existence of an object if
the object were within our power” (KpV 5:58, translation altered). In other
words, morally good action is action under the guidance of the moral law.
The upshot of Kant’s account of the good, for the question regarding the
moral status of happiness, is the following. Promoting happiness is morally
good (that is, it is an object of pure practical reason) if and only if it is morally
allowed to will it. Furthermore, the mere fact that we desire our own happiness
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does not justify calling happiness good – it does not even justify calling it a “non-
moral good”.
2 From the Good to the Highest Good
In the Dialectic of the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant proceeds to a discussion
of the “highest good”, which he defines as the “unconditioned totality of the ob-
ject of pure practical reason” (KpV 5:108). In the Analytic, Kant determined the
good in itself formally as the object of pure practical reason, that is, as action
under the guidance of the moral law. He now determines the highest good as
the unconditioned totality of the object of pure practical reason (KpV 5:108). On
the basis of the conception of the object of pure practical reason as action
under the guidance of the moral law, the highest good is the world in which
all rational agents universally act under the guidance of the moral law. What
would the world be like, if every moral subject always acted as the Categorical
Imperative demands?
According to Kant, this is a natural question for finite rational beings to ask.
Reason always seeks the unconditioned, striving – also in its practical employment
– to establish systematic unity and totality (see Watkins 2010; Kleingeld 1998a). In
this case reason forms the idea of a moral world, by synthesizing the totality of
moral demands into a single moral ideal (KrVA808/B836). Kant argues that the re-
sulting notion of a moral world, as the highest good, has two elements. First of all, it
includes virtue, as the “supreme” good, that is, as that which is unconditionally
good. In order to be the “complete” good, however, Kant adds, the highest good
must also include happiness. The two elements are to be connected in such a
way that the first is the cause of the second (KpV 5:110).
It is not surprising that Kant designates virtue as the “supreme” good. The
highest good is conceived as a world in which all agents act morally, so virtue
is necessarily part of it. Moreover, moral agents have the duty to strive for
their own perfection, so doing so is clearly a morally good way of acting and vir-
tue is clearly an object of pure practical reason. Hence, universal virtue is includ-
ed in the “absolute totality” of the “object of pure practical reason”.
As mentioned in the introduction, Kant’s account of the highest good has been
the target of many objections, however, because of his inclusion of happiness into
the notion of the highest good and because of his claim that it is a duty to promote
the highest good. How can happiness be designated as good, rather than as pleas-
ant? Moreover, is it consistent for Kant to claim that it is a duty to promote the high-
est good if the latter includes happiness? I shall address these questions in turn,
starting with Kant’s inclusion of happiness in the highest good.
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Several strategies for defending Kant’s inclusion of happiness in the highest
good are found in the literature. Some authors have argued that happiness, in
the highest good, is limited to the satisfaction of one’s morally permissible
ends (Reath 1988), which means that its inclusion does not run counter to
moral demands. Others have argued that we regard virtue alone as less good
than virtue plus happiness, because we desire happiness, and therefore – so
the argument goes – the highest good must also include happiness (this line
of reasoning is suggested, among others, by Beiser 2006: 595). On both of
these interpretations, however, happiness is included on the basis of the expect-
ation of its agreeableness, and not because of its moral goodness. Moreover, if
happiness is included in the highest good on the basis of our desire for it –
even if this desire is limited to what is morally permissible – this still makes it
hard to see how we could have a duty to promote the highest good. 
A very different strategy for defending Kant’s inclusion of happiness in the
highest good could be thought to be possible on the grounds that Kant argues
that it is a duty – albeit an “indirect” one – to promote one’s own happiness in-
sofar as it is necessary for the sake of morality (KpV 5:93; GMS 4:399). If promot-
ing one’s own happiness (even if only to a degree) is a duty, then this would
seem to warrant designating happiness as good. Nevertheless, this strategy for
defending the inclusion of happiness in the highest good does not succeed.
Kant defends the indirect duty to promote one’s own happiness on the basis
of the fact that one may be tempted to violate the moral law if even one’s
most basic human needs are not met. The concept of the highest good as a
moral world, however, is derived exactly by abstracting from such temptations
(KrV A808/B836); its first element is perfect virtue. Therefore, the indirect duty
to promote one’s own happiness (to a certain degree) cannot explain the inclu-
sion of happiness in the highest good.
Furthermore, the indirect duty to promote one’s own happiness is limited to
the degree that doing so is required for the sake of morality. By contrast, Kant’s
definition of happiness includes the complete realization of all of an agent’s
ends. In the Dialectic of the Critique of Practical Reason, he defines happiness
as follows:
￿ An additional difficulty for this strategy is that if happiness is included in the highest good on
the grounds that virtue-plus-happiness is preferable to virtue-without-happiness, this does not
explain why Kant calls the relation between virtue and happiness in the moral world a necessary
causal connection. For happiness might then in principle also be brought about by other means
than by virtuous action. It could, for example, be regarded as a reward or supplement distrib-
uted by God (see Beiser ￿￿￿￿: ￿￿￿–￿).
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“Happiness is the state of a rational being in the world in the whole of whose existence
everything goes according to his wish and will, and rests, therefore, on the harmony of nature
with his whole end as well as with the essential determining ground of his will” (KpV 5:124).
This definition is important in two other respects as well. First, Kant defines hap-
piness in terms of the harmony between an agent’s ends and the state of the
world, not in terms of how the agent feels. Agents count as happy when things
go the way they want them to go. Second, the reference to “essential determining
grounds of the will” indicates that happiness should not be understood merely
as a matter of the satisfaction of morally permissible contingent desires. When
happiness is conceived as element of the highest good, that is, as the happiness
of virtuous agents, it also includes the realization of their moral ends.
This, in turn, suggests a different strategy for making sense of Kant’s inclu-
sion of happiness in the highest good, a strategy which yields a rather straight-
forward explanation. If we conceive of that which is morally good as the object of
pure practical reason, and of the highest good as the “unconditioned totality” of
this object, then the highest good is, as Kant puts it in the Religion within the
Boundaries of Mere Reason, the “world [which one] would create, were this in
[one’s] power, under the guidance of practical reason” (RGV 6:5). The highest
good, then, is the world that all moral agents, acting under the direction of
the moral law, bring into existence when it is in their power to realize the object
of their actions. In order to know what this world comprises, therefore, we
should examine what morality demands that we do; that is, we should look to
our list of duties. This list includes our own moral perfection first of all, of
course, and, as we saw above, Kant includes virtue in the highest good. It is
also the duty of every moral agent, however, to promote the happiness of others
by adopting others’ (permissible) ends as their own. Kant argues on many occa-
sions that promoting the happiness of others is a duty (KpV 5:34–5; GMS 4:423;
MS 6:385–8, 453). And in the Metaphysics of Morals Kant designates “one’s own
perfection” and the “happiness of others” as the two “ends that are at the same
time duties” (MS 6:385–8).
If it is a moral duty to promote the happiness of others, then the highest
good, conceived as an ideal moral world populated by virtuous agents, does in-
clude the happiness of all. In a moral world, I promote the happiness of others,
and others promote mine. The happiness of each is good in the eyes of the oth-
ers, and vice versa. This means that the virtuous agents in this world collectively
aim at the happiness of all.  In this way, the inclusion of happiness in the highest
￿ This duty is restricted to promoting the morally permissible ends of others, and so it might
seem to lead to the problem that the others’ conception of their happiness comprises more
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good can be defended on the grounds that the moral law demands that it be pro-
moted. This in turn means that happiness, brought about by virtuous action, is
indeed morally good and not merely pleasant. 
This interpretation of Kant’s grounds for including happiness into the high-
est good is confirmed by passages in which Kant says as much. In the Critique of
Pure Reason, Kant describes the highest good in terms of a moral world in which
rational beings, “under the guidance of such [moral] principles, would them-
selves be the authors both of their own enduring welfare and at the same time
that of others” (KrV A809/B837). This world is a “system of self-rewarding mor-
ality”, and it is an idea “the realization of which rests on the condition that ev-
eryone do what he should” (KrV A809/B837). The rational inhabitants of this
world are virtuous: they all act under the guidance of moral principles, and
their virtuous activity causes general happiness.
If happiness is included in the highest good on the grounds of duty, this also
explains Kant’s use of causal language describing the relation between virtue
and happiness. It is often overlooked that Kant calls happiness, as component
of the highest good as a moral world, an “effect” or “result” of virtue (KpV
5:115, 119; RGV 6:7n.), as being “caused” by virtue (KpV 5:111, 114). These expres-
sions suggest that happiness is indeed conceived as the end and the result of vir-
tuous action.S 
In sum, the highest good, when conceived as a moral world, is the world that
moral agents would bring into existence if their agency faced no obstacles, that
is, if all moral agents were fully virtuous and their actions would achieve their
moral ends. The highest good includes happiness because morality demands
that we make the happiness of others our end, while making it a duty on the
part of others to promote ours (as part of their duty to promote the happiness
of others). Thus conceived, the idea of the highest good as comprising both virtue
than moral agents are willing to endorse. Because Kant conceives the agents in the ideal moral
world as fully virtuous, however, these perfect agents will not have morally impermissible ends,
and so this problem does not emerge.
￿ Importantly, this point also sheds light on Kant’s inclusion of happiness in the notion of the
highest good “in a person”. Kant justifies this on the grounds that a virtuous person’s happiness
is good in the eyes of another rational being who is impartial and perfect. Here, too, the virtuous
person’s happiness is called morally good because the other imagined rational being regards the
virtuous person as an end and wills the virtuous person’s happiness (KpV ￿:￿￿￿).
￿￿ This is not the only way in which Kant speaks of the connection of virtue and happiness:
when discussing the highest good for an individual (the highest good “in a person”, KpV
￿:￿￿￿), Kant mentions God as the cause of happiness (e.g., KrV A￿￿￿/B￿￿￿, A￿￿￿/B￿￿￿).
But as mentioned in the introduction, in this essay I focus on the notion of the highest good
as a moral world.
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and happiness is defined completely in terms of that which is morally good, that
is, in terms of action under the guidance of the moral law.
On this interpretation, developing the idea of the highest good requires a
specific form of rational activity, namely, thinking through what morality re-
quires and then synthesizing this into a single ideal. It requires determining sys-
tematically what way of acting the moral law requires, which leads to the insight
that moral agency can be brought under the most general headings of pursuing
our own moral perfection and the happiness of others. The idea of the highest
good is developed by pure practical reason, when it extends itself “beyond ob-
servance of the formal law to production of an object (the highest good)”, that is,
when it conceives of the world that universal moral agency would realize and
then conceives that world as its final end (Gemeinspruch 8:280n.; cf. RGV
6:7n.). The idea of the highest good is formed by thinking through which duties
the application of the moral law would yield, and then developing the idea of the
world that would be brought into existence by universal virtue.SS It is an idea that
“rises out of morality and is not its foundation; it is an end which to make one’s
own already presupposes ethical principles” (RGV 6:5).
3 The Duty to Promote the Highest Good
Kant’s claim that it is a duty to promote the highest good is, on the face of it, very
puzzling, even when it is related to a moral world instead of to a proportional rela-
tion between individual virtue and happiness. It raises the question whether this
duty is just another way of saying that we have a duty to obey the Categorical Im-
perative, or whether it goes beyond this. On the one hand, it would seem that it can-
not be an additional duty, over and above the duty to obey the Categorical Imper-
ative. If it were, this would seem to imply that the latter is not fully sufficient as a
guide in moral matters after all, because there would be at least one duty in addi-
tion to what it tells us to do. On the other hand, if the duty to promote the highest
good does not go beyond the duty to obey the Categorical Imperative, then what is
the point of mentioning this duty at all? Kant’s argument regarding these matters is
very brief, and any interpretation of it will have to rely not merely on textual evi-
dence but also on philosophical (re)construction.
￿￿ Relatedly, Kant argues not merely that every rational agent has a duty to promote the highest
good, but also that this duty is a duty of the human race towards itself (RGV ￿:￿￿).
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Kant claims that the Categorical Imperative commands that we promote the
highest good,SQ but he does not actually spell out the details of the justification
of this claim. At first sight it is confusing that he claims that this obligation is
based on the Categorical Imperative while also insisting that it is not contained
in it or in our particular duties. For example, Kant writes:
“[the claim that humans ought to make the highest good their end] goes beyond the con-
cept of the duties in this world, and adds a consequence (an effect) of these duties that is
not contained in the moral laws and cannot, therefore, be developed out of these laws an-
alytically” (RGV 6:7n., translation modified).
Here he claims that the duty to promote the highest good “goes beyond” the
moral laws: it “adds a consequence” that is “not contained in the moral
laws”. Similarly, in “On the Common Saying”, Kant writes:
“The need for a final end assigned by pure reason and comprehending the whole of all
ends under one principle (a world as the highest good and possible also through our coop-
eration) is a need of an unselfish will extending itself beyond observance of the formal law
to production of an object (the highest good)” (Gemeinspruch 8:280n.).
Again Kant speaks of an “extension” that goes “beyond” observing the formal
(moral) law. This way of putting it presents two difficulties. First, Kant’s statement
that this duty adds something that is “not contained” in the “formal law” (i.e.,
the moral law) seems to suggest that the duty to promote the highest good is at
least partially based on something other than the moral law. If the claim is indeed
that there is another source of moral duties, this would run counter to the results of
the Groundwork and the Analytic of the Critique of Practical Reason.
Second, Kant’s appeal to a “need” to motivate the “extension” seems to be at
least as problematic. It seems to indicate that the duty is indeed based on a con-
sideration that is foreign to the rest of Kant’s moral theory, because mere appeal
to needs does not suffice to ground moral duties. Given that Kant seems to view
the duty to promote the highest good as justified by a need (albeit a “need of the
will”) and that he writes that this duty cannot be analytically derived from the
formal principle of morality, the duty seems to be on shaky ground.
Some commentators have suggested that the duty to promote the highest
good can be defended in terms of its moral usefulness. They suggest that the
duty to promote the highest good might be justified by the fact that promoting
a moral world would bring about the social conditions needed for realizing fun-
￿￿ KpV ￿:￿￿￿, ￿￿￿, ￿￿￿, ￿￿￿; KU ￿:￿￿￿, ￿￿￿, ￿￿￿n.; RGV ￿:￿n.
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damental moral ends in general (Reath 1988: 617 n.30, 619) or that it is the best
way to promote virtue within ourselves (Fugate 2014: 151). The problem with any
justification of the duty to promote the highest good in terms of some other, more
fundamental moral endeavor is conceptual: the highest good would not be the
highest good if promoting it were morally required in the service of something
else, even if, in this case, ‘something else’ is obedience to the moral law itself.
Others have suggested that the duty to promote the highest good does not
really amount to a special duty at all. Sometimes this is meant as a criticism
(Beck 1960: 244–5), but other authors argue, in defense of Kant’s position, that
the duty to promote the highest good “coincides” entirely with the duties Kant
identifies as an individual’s duties (Engstrom 1992: 776). This interpretation
has the hermeneutic disadvantage, however, that it does not explain in what
way the duty to promote the highest good goes “beyond” the duties that flow
from the Categorical Imperative, as Kant claims it does.
The analysis, in the previous section, of how the idea of the highest good is
developed on the basis of the concept of the good, however, provides the basis
for a valid argument in support of the duty to promote the highest good, an argu-
ment, moreover, that also explains how this duty goes “beyond” the list of duties
that follows from applying the Categorical Imperative. If the highest good is de-
fined as the world that would be brought into existence by universal virtue (if our
powers were sufficient to achieve our ends), this implies not only that moral ac-
tion promotes the highest good, but also that nothing else promotes the highest
good. For if virtue is the supreme condition of the highest good, it is impossible
to promote the highest good in any way independently from the Categorical Im-
perative. In other words, given how the highest good is defined, moral agency
does not promote the highest good accidentally, but necessarily. The highest
good is brought about through virtuous action and only through virtuous action,
as its supreme condition.
Given that acting in accordance with the Categorical Imperative necessarily
promotes the highest good, and that the highest good cannot be promoted any
other way (that is, it cannot be promoted in a non-virtuous manner), we can for-
mulate the following argument:
1. We ought to act in accordance with the Categorical Imperative;
2. Acting in accordance with the Categorical Imperative, and only acting in
accordance with the Categorical Imperative, necessarily promotes the
highest good;
3. Therefore, we ought to promote the highest good.
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The second premise requires a good deal of further clarification, however, espe-
cially regarding the nature of the connection between acting in accordance with
the Categorical Imperative and promoting the highest good. As stated, this prem-
ise could seem to posit an analytic connection. If acting in accordance with the
Categorical Imperative is simply synonymous with promoting the highest good,
then the connection is analytic. In that case, the argument goes through, but the
duty in the conclusion does not go “beyond” the duty expressed in the first
premise. “Promoting the highest good” would be just another way of saying “act-
ing in accordance with the Categorical Imperative”. As is perfectly clear from the
passages quoted above, however, Kant explicitly claims that the duty to promote
the highest good cannot be derived analytically from the duty to act in accord-
ance with the Categorical Imperative.
On the other hand, if the connection between acting in accordance with the Cat-
egorical Imperative and promoting the highest good is not analytic, it could seem
contingent, and then the argument would not go through. If acting in accordance
with the Categorical Imperative merely contingently leads to the highest good,
then the deontic status of the first premise does not transfer to the third. An exam-
ple helps to clarify this: If I have a duty to help others in need, and if, when I do
help others in need they (contingently) happen to give me flowers with a thank-
you note, it does not follow that I have a duty to make others give me flowers
with a thank-you note. This is why the second premise includes “necessarily”.
In other words, if the connection between obedience to the Categorical Im-
perative and promoting the highest good is analytic, the conclusion is valid but
the latter does not go beyond the former; and if the connection is contingent, the
argument is not valid and does not lead to a duty to promote the highest good.
To avoid both results, the connection stated in the second premise needs to
be synthetic and yet necessary (a priori). This is precisely Kant’s contention,
however. He writes:
“[T]hat every human being ought to make the highest possible good in the world his own
final end is a synthetic practical proposition a priori, that is, an objective-practical propo-
sition given through pure reason” (RGV 6:7n., translation altered).
On the basis of the analysis in the previous section, we are now in a position to
make sense of this statement. Because the idea of the highest good is construct-
ed on the basis of the Categorical Imperative itself, the highest good is necessa-
rily the result of action in accordance with the Categorical Imperative. The con-
nection is nevertheless synthetic because one cannot derive the notion of the
highest good by analyzing the Categorical Imperative itself. This is because the
idea is developed through a synthesizing operation that involves first conceiving
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of everything the Categorical Imperative demands – that is, the moral duties it
imposes on us – and then taking the result together into a complete whole. In
this sense it is an extension “beyond” the Categorical Imperative.
An analogy may help to make this clearer. Suppose my boss commands that I
do what she says. She first gives me one task, and then another, and so on. First
she tells me to make a wheel, and then another wheel; then she tells me to weld
one metal tube to another tube, at an odd angle; then she tells me to weld a third
tube to the first two, and on and on. I may complete each of my tasks just like that,
seeing myself as simply following the formal command to “do what she says”, and
as carrying out the specific duties of making one wheel, then another, then weld-
ing some tubes, and so on. But it would be natural for me to start wondering what
my activities are eventually going to amount to – where all of this is going. Know-
ing the answer would change my understanding of what I am doing. I cannot de-
rive the answer to this question from the injunction to “do what she says”, how-
ever. The imperative is merely formal and does not allow the inference to any
specific end my boss has in mind. Moreover, a partial list of assignments would
leave open many possible outcomes. At the start I might still think that I need
to make a large number of wheels, or a bicycle trailer, or a modern work of art.
Only once I see the complete list of assignments and mentally put all the steps to-
gether does it become possible for me to see that I am, in this example, building a
bicycle. It then becomes possible for me to conceive of each of the partial tasks as
contributions to the larger project of building a bicycle by following the specific
steps. This project goes beyond the formal imperative to “do what she says” and
the individual assignments my boss gives me, because it takes the list of concrete
tasks as a whole, synthesizing the individual tasks into the overall project of build-
ing a bicycle. This conception of the larger project is not analytically contained in
the formal requirement to “do what she says”. It “broadens” and “extends” my
perspective as an agent from merely doing what she says, completing the individ-
ual assignments one by one, to a focus on the final end – I should build a bicycle.
Furthermore, this final end is not contingently related to the requirement to do
what she says, because the bicycle is a necessary consequence of following all
the steps she lists (after all, the very end of building a bicycle was established
on the basis of the list of steps). Finally, recognizing the overall end of my follow-
ing the list of particular assignments does not give me license to build just any
bicycle in whatever way I see fit. Rather, my task is to build a bicycle following
this particular list of steps, by doing what my boss tells me to do.
The analogy is not perfect, of course, because my boss’s imperative is a het-
eronomous command, it is directed at me rather than at all rational beings, and
the bicycle is a product that will have independent existence once it is built
(whereas a moral world, because it requires virtue, requires an ongoing effort).
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Yet there is an illuminating structural similarity between this example and the
duty to promote the highest good. The duty to promote the highest good cannot
analytically be derived from the formal Categorical Imperative as such. Only once
we conceive of the absolute totality of everything that is morally demanded by
the Categorical Imperative do we come to conceive of the highest good as the
final end of moral agency. This gives us a new sense of purpose and a new under-
standing of what we are doing that goes beyond the formal command to obey the
Categorical Imperative and our list of specific duties taken one by one. Just as the
list of partial assignments, taken together as a whole, yields the assignment to
“build a bicycle (by doing what she says)”, the absolute totality of all moral du-
ties of all agents, taken together as a whole, yields the duty to promote the high-
est good (via the argument specified above). Recognizing this requires the dis-
tinctive reflective operation of synthesizing the “absolute totality” of the object
of pure practical reason. This procedure explains why the synthetic relation be-
tween the Categorical Imperative and the duty to promote the highest good is not
merely contingent but necessary.
The example also illuminates why the duty to promote the highest good does
indeed go beyond the Categorical Imperative without circumventing it. When I
am faced with a formal meta-command (to do what my boss says) and a long
list of discrete tasks, finding out at some point during the process of assembly
(but before the end) that I am to build a bicycle does add essential new informa-
tion about what my assignment consists in, without adding an additional step to
the list. “Build a bicycle (by doing what she says)” goes beyond the assignment
to “do what she says”, without introducing an additional assignment that is gen-
erated independently from my boss’s general demand that I do what she says.
Similarly, from my perspective as an agent who ought to act in accordance
with the Categorical Imperative and who is faced with a long list of discrete
moral duties, finding out that I am to promote the highest good does add new
information, without adding another separate duty to my list. As Kant put it,
“harmonizing with this final end [viz., the highest good] does not increase the number of
morality’s duties but rather provides these with a special point of reference for the unifica-
tion of all ends” (RGV 6:5, translation altered).
One final issue that still needs to be addressed is Kant’s claim that the concep-
tion of the highest good is formed on the basis of a ‘need’. As became clear
above, Kant writes that the conception of the highest good springs from the
will’s “need for a final end” (Gemeinspruch 8:280n.). Elsewhere, Kant claims it
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“is one of the inescapable limitations of human beings and of their practical faculty of reason
(perhaps of that faculty in all other worldly beings as well) to be concerned in every action with
its result, seeking something in it that might serve them as an end […]” (RGV 6:7n.).
The fact that Kant calls this tendency an “inescapable limitation” of human be-
ings might make it sound like a regrettable feature, an anthropologically based
shortcoming it is unfortunately impossible to get rid of. If this is how the com-
ment should be read, this might still be seen as causing trouble for Kant’s argu-
ment that it is a duty to promote the highest good. However, as the parenthetical
comment and Kant’s mention of practical reason make clear, the limitation Kant
has in mind is tied to the nature of reason, and to human nature only insofar as
humans are finite rational beings – not to contingent sensible needs. This relates
Kant’s comment to his broader description of reason as having “needs” and “in-
terests” that it cannot dismiss (cp. KrV Avii), and in particular to his description
of reason as striving for the unconditioned. The “need” of the will – and it is im-
portant to remember that Kant equates the will with practical reason – is, then,
best understood against this background of Kant’s conception of the nature of
reason itself. In the Dialectic of the first Critique, Kant provides an account of
the ideas of speculative reason as based on reason’s “need” for systematic
unity and completeness (KrVAvii, A796/B824). In the Dialectic of the second Cri-
tique, the same rational tendency leads to the idea of the highest good. The con-
ception of the highest good does not spring from a sensible need, but, rather,
from a tendency that Kant regards as characteristic for reason as such, whether
in its speculative or its practical employment.SR
In sum, on the basis of Kant’s account of the good we can explain Kant’s in-
clusion of happiness in the highest good – at least when the highest good is con-
ceived as a moral world, which is the conception I focus on in this essay. On the
interpretation I have argued for, happiness is morally good insofar as (and only
insofar as) moral agents have a duty to promote each other’s happiness. Happi-
ness is included in the highest good because the fully virtuous agents in this
“moral world” collectively bring about the happiness of all. On the basis of
this interpretation, it is possible to reconstruct a logically valid argument, with
premises Kant clearly endorses, in support of his claim that it is a duty to pro-
mote the highest good. Finally, this interpretation explains the sense in which
￿￿ On Kant’s terminology of ‘needs’ and ‘interests’ of theoretical and practical reason, see
Kleingeld ￿￿￿￿a and ￿￿￿￿b.
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this duty goes beyond obedience to the Categorical Imperative without increas-
ing the number of our duties.S 
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